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Abstract
Empirical research suggests that parents￿economic resources a⁄ect their chil-
dren￿ s future earnings abilities. Optimal tax policy therefore will treat future
ability distributions as endogenous to current taxes. We model this endogeneity,
calibrate the model to match estimates of the intergenerational transmission of
earnings ability in the United States, and use the model to simulate optimal pol-
icy numerically. Optimal policy is more redistributive toward low-income parents
than existing U.S. tax policy. The optimal policy increases the probability that
low-income children move up the economic ladder, generating a present-value
welfare gain of 1.28% of consumption in our baseline case.
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1Introduction
Economists have long recognized that parents￿resources and investment in their children
may be key determinants of their children￿ s outcomes (Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes 1976;
Becker 1981; Becker and Tomes 1986). This paper is motivated by recent evidence that
increasing the disposable incomes of poor parents raises the performance of their children
on tests of cognitive ability. That ￿nding suggests that current tax policy may a⁄ect the
future distribution of underlying income-earning abilities in the taxpayer population, the
key determinant of how di¢ cult a tradeo⁄ between e¢ ciency and equality society will face
in the future. The dominant modern model of optimal taxation is unable to take this e⁄ect
into account, as it assumes that the distribution of ability is entirely exogenous. Our paper
is an analytical and numerical exploration of the implications for optimal policy of relaxing
this assumption.
First, we generalize a standard dynamic Mirrleesian optimal tax model to include the
e⁄ect of parental disposable income on children￿ s abilities. In the standard model of James
Mirrlees (1971), ability is exogenously given. In our model, a child￿ s ability depends on three
components: parental ability, which is exogenous to the parent and child; parental disposable
income, which is endogenously chosen by parents given the tax system; and a stochastic
shock. These components imply that the process generating children￿ s skills in our model
is partly exogenous, partly endogenous, and stochastic. By combining these components,
our model introduces a novel element to the recent literature on dynamic optimal taxation
that seeks, among other goals, to capture the complex process by which society￿ s ability
distribution is determined.1
Using this model, we derive analytical conditions that reveal the key e⁄ects of endogenous
ability on intratemporal and intertemporal optimal policy. On the intratemporal margin, we
￿nd contradictory forces at play. First, marginal income tax rates are lower on parents whose
economic resources matter more for their children￿ s expected abilities. Lower marginal tax
rates encourage greater parental earnings and disposable income, and because of endogenous
1We abstract from other aspects of the ability distribution that are also currently being studied, such as
the lifecycle path of earnings (see Matthew Weinzierl 2011 or Emmanuel Farhi and Ivan Werning 2011, for
example).
2ability, these parents thus produce higher-skilled children from whom society will be able to
collect more tax revenue. Evidence suggests the impact of parental resources on child skills
is largest among parents with low incomes, so this force is likely to lead to lower optimal
marginal tax rates on low incomes relative to high incomes. Second, lower marginal tax
rates on low incomes will, in expectation, di⁄erentially bene￿t the low-skilled members of
prior generations because low-income parents are more likely than high-income parents to
have low-ability children. This di⁄erential bene￿t increases the temptation for high-ability
parents to mimic low-ability parents by earning less and accepting the greater probability
of having low-ability children. In doing so, it worsens the distortionary e⁄ects of marginal
taxes on e⁄ort, so this force is likely to lead to higher optimal marginal tax rates at low
incomes relative to high incomes. The relative strength of these forces determines how
optimal marginal tax rates di⁄er from a conventional policy.
On the intertemporal margin, we derive a condition showing that the allocation of re-
sources across generations should equalize the cost of raising welfare across generations,
taking into account not only the marginal utilities of individuals in each generation (as in
a conventional model), but also the e⁄ects of the current distribution of resources on future
generations￿tax payments and utility levels. As a result, optimal policy takes advantage of
its potential to shape the ability distribution of future generations. For example, suppose
hypothetically that the ability distribution is stable across generations under an existing tax
policy (consistent with our simulations in Section 4 below). A conventional optimal policy
model would recommend that generations be treated similarly, as each generation resembles
the next. Our model may recommend a di⁄erent approach. Namely, the optimal policy in
this case borrows from future generations to fund greater after-tax income for parents in the
current generation. Together, these intra- and inter-generational transfers can generate an
upward trajectory for the ability distribution across generations, generating more productive
future populations and greater welfare overall.
Second, we calibrate our model to empirical evidence and solve numerically for the opti-
mal policy. The model calibration requires empirical estimates of key statistics describing the
transmission of ability across generations under an existing tax policy. To generate these es-
timates, we study the e⁄ect of policy changes in the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
3on the ability levels of taxpayers￿children. Our empirical approach adapts the strategy of
Gordon Dahl and Lance Lochner (forthcoming) in order to generate estimates relevant to the
calibration exercise we perform.2 Speci￿cally, dividing matched parents and children in the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and Children of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (CNLSY) into two equally-sized ability categories each, we estimate the
e⁄ect of parents￿after-tax income on the probability that low- and high-wage parents have
children in each of these ability categories, and we calculate the transition matrices between
ability categories across generations. Then, using Laurence Kotliko⁄ and David Rapson￿ s
(2007) estimates of e⁄ective marginal tax rates in the United States as the status quo tax
policy, we ￿nd the values of the model￿ s parameters that yield a model output that best
matches the target statistics, when optimizing households take that policy as given.
We use the calibrated model to simulate optimal policy, and we ￿nd that the optimal
policy redistributes substantially more toward low-ability parents and earlier generations
than does the status quo policy. As a consequence, the mean ability level increases across
generations under the optimal policy relative to the status quo, with a smaller share of the
population having low ability and a larger share having high ability. We then calculate the
increase in aggregate welfare due to the improved evolution of the ability distribution. We
￿nd that the gain is equivalent to a permanent increase in disposable income￿ i.e. an increase
in disposable income for all generations￿ of more than one percent. Gains are substantially
larger if we use three ability types rather than two, though our estimates are less precise in
that case.
This paper introduces a new element to the active literature in dynamic optimal taxation.
Following the original contribution of Mikhail Golosov, Narayana Kocherlakota, and Aleh
Tsyvinski (2003), most work in this area has considered the impact of stochastic and exoge-
nous skill processes on the optimal taxation of an individual over his lifetime.3 Emmanuel
Farhi and IvÆn Werning (2010a) extend that approach to characterize optimal taxation across
generations, noting in their opening sentence that "One of the biggest risks in life is the fam-
2Viewed in isolation, we see the empirical work as merely a secondary contribution of the paper, as our
work is closely related to the Dahl and Lochner analysis. The estimates it generates are primarily useful as
inputs to the calibration and simulation of the model.
3Contributions include Kocherlakota (2005), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), Albanesi and Sleet (2006),
Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2007), Farhi and Werning (2010b), and Weinzierl (2011).
4ily one is born into. We partly inherit the luck, good or bad, of our parents through the
wealth they accumulate." Their important analysis assumed, however, that children￿ s skills
are independent of their parents￿abilities and their parents￿economic resources, leaving un-
addressed a core part of the "family risk" that is their focus.4 We take up the complementary
analysis. That is, we analyze optimal tax policy when the skill distribution of one generation
depends on the skill distribution and the choices of the previous generation (subject to sto-
chastic shocks). Because we allow the skill distribution to be endogenously determined, our
paper is closely related to another body of work that extends the original dynamic optimal
tax literature by allowing individuals￿choices to a⁄ect their own ability levels (see Casey
Rothschild and Florian Scheuer 2011, for example).5
The core conceptual contribution of this paper is to take into account the dynamic inter-
action between exogenous and endogenous components of skill heterogeneity.6 We consider
how choices by parents a⁄ect the abilities taken as given by their children, and how these
abilities in turn a⁄ect the set of choices available to children. This interaction is a central
factor in optimal policy, in that it is the crux of the tradeo⁄ between redistributing to the
poor later (i.e. equalizing the distribution of outcomes) and investing in their skills now
(i.e. equalizing the distribution of opportunities). For example, if future skill levels among
the poor can be increased through current transfers, the net bene￿t of those transfers to
society will be increased. Though its application is most apparent across generations, the
interaction between natural ability and human capital investments is also relevant for issues
such as optimal life-cycle tax and training policies and social insurance program design.
Modeling this interaction is challenging, however, and one technical contribution of this
4Farhi and Werning do consider a simple form of parental investment in children￿ s human capital in the
two-period version of their analysis, but children do not exert e⁄ort in that version.
5Other examples include the following. Marek Kapicka (2006a, 2006b) allows a deterministic skill process
to be endogenous. Borys Grochulski and Tomasz Piskorski (2010) allow a population of identical agents to
choose a human capital investment, the output and depreciation of which are stochastic, thus combining
stochasticity with a form of endogeneity. Dan Anderberg (2009) extends that approach by allowing for
heterogeneous ability shocks, the e⁄ects of which on earnings can be magni￿ed or reduced by human capital
investment undertaken by identical agents before the ability shocks are realized.
6Kapicka (2006a,b) has heterogeneity in natural ability, but each type is ￿xed for life, and all types share
the same human capital production function. Grochulski and Piskorski (2010) have no heterogeneity outside
of shocks to the human capital production function, the returns to which are therefore not dependent on
natural ability. Anderberg (2009) has human capital and an exogenous shock interact, but human capital
investment decisions are made by agents before their ability heterogeneity is realized.
5paper is a novel formal simpli￿cation of the dynamics of the endogenous ability distribution.
Rather than having parental resources directly a⁄ect the levels of children￿ s abilities, we
locate the e⁄ects of parental resources on the distribution of children across a ￿xed set of
abilities. In combination with history-independence, the natural assumption that taxes on
individuals do not depend on the income of their parents or children, our use of a ￿xed
set of abilities with an endogenous distribution rather than an endogenous set of abilities
substantially simpli￿es the computations of the optimal policy.7 This technique may prove
useful in other contexts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the model. Section 2 derives analyti-
cal conditions that describe the optimal policy both within and across generations. Section
3 calibrates the model to existing U.S. tax policy and new empirical evidence on the trans-
mission of ability across generations. Section 4 uses the calibrated model to simulate and
characterize both the structure and welfare implications of optimal tax policy in our context.
Section 5 concludes. An Appendix contains details of the analytical and empirical results.
1 Model
Individuals are linked in families, with one individual per generation in each family. Gen-
erations are indexed by t 2 f1;2;:::;Tg. Each individual has one of a ￿xed set of possible
income-earning abilities, or "types," denoted w and indexed by i 2 f1;2;:::;Ig. The dis-
tribution of individuals across types is exogenous in the ￿rst generation, but in subsequent
generations it is endogenous and is a function of the distribution of after-tax income in the
previous generation as well as of the inheritance of type. Formally, denote with pj ￿
wi
t;ci0
t
￿
the probability that an individual of generation t + 1 is of type j given that her parent (in
generation t) was of type i and had the disposable income c designed for type i0: Disposable
income is in turn determined by both the tax system and individual utility maximization
and is equal to earned income less taxes.
7The alternative approach, in which types vary continuously with parental resources, means that a planner
has to specify allocations for all possible deviation paths. Assume history independence; if there are I initial
types, that approach must specify (It)
2 allocations in generation t, which grows large with I and t. The
approach taken in this paper implies that only I2 allocations must be speci￿ed at that same point. If I = 3
and T = 6, for instance, the two approaches require 531,441 and 9 allocations, respectively.
61.1 Planner￿ s problem
The planner￿ s problem is to choose an allocation of earned income y and disposable income
c for each type i in each generation t. These allocations may di⁄er across generations. The
planner￿ s objective is to maximize the present-value utility of the population of families start-
ing from generation t subject to the constraints that disposable income must be funded by
output (feasibility) and that individuals respond to the tax system (incentive compatibility).
We also impose the constraint that taxes may depend on only the current generation￿ s
characteristics and choices. In other words, taxes are restricted to be independent of history
and cannot depend on the income of the taxpayer￿ s parents or children. This restriction is
convenient in a variety of dynamic optimal tax contexts such as Kapicka￿ s (2006) analysis of
human capital. In the context of this paper, however, there is a more fundamental reason to
impose this restriction: realism. No tax system does or, we conjecture, ever will levy taxes
on a child that depend in any direct way on that child￿ s parents￿characteristics. There seems
to be a strong normative aversion to such history-dependence across generations, so we will
impose it on the policy here.
Formally, the planner￿ s problem is as follows:
Problem 1 Planner￿ s Problem
max
fci
￿;yi
￿g
1;I
￿=t;i=1
X
i
p
iU
i
t (1)
where Ui
t, the present-value expected utility of a family with parents of type i, is de￿ned
recursively as
U
i
t = u
￿
c
i
t
￿
￿ v
￿
yi
t
wi
t
￿
+ ￿
I X
j=1
p
j ￿
w
i
t;c
i
t
￿
U
j
t+1:
This is maximized subject to feasibility:
X
i
p
iR
i
t ￿ ￿ R; (2)
where ￿ R is an exogenous revenue requirement, and Ri
t is the expected present value of all
current and future tax revenue of a family with parents of type i, de￿ned recursively as
7follows
R
i
t =
￿
y
i
t ￿ c
i
t
￿
+ ￿
X
j
p
j ￿
w
i
t;c
i
t
￿
R
j
t+1;
and incentive compatibility for each generation:
U
i
￿ ￿ U
i0ji
￿ for all generations ￿ and types i;i
0; (3)
and U
i0ji
￿ denotes the utility obtained by an individual of type i when claiming to be type i0 :
U
i0ji
￿ = u
￿
c
i0
t
￿
￿ v
￿
yi0
t
wi
t
￿
+ ￿
I X
j=1
p
j
￿
w
i
t;c
i0
t
￿
U
j
t+1: (4)
A technical note: expression (4) shows the usefulness of assuming a ￿xed distribution of
types, as the next step of the recursion, U
j
t+1, is not directly a⁄ected by the deviation.
1.2 Limitations
Some apparent limitations of the setup deserve clari￿cation.
First, while the setup has the same measure of parental resources serve as the quantity of
consumption in the parent￿ s utility function and the input to the child￿ s ability production
function, we are not asserting that the way in which parental disposable income is used is
irrelevant to their child￿ s ability. Rather, we are guided not only by tractability but by the
data. The empirical evidence we have concerns the e⁄ect on a child￿ s ability of transfers
to parents through the tax system; we have no data on how those transfers were allocated.
To calibrate to this evidence, our model must also leave the allocation of these transfers
unspeci￿ed. We use the term disposable income, rather than consumption, throughout the
paper to make this aspect of our analysis clear.
Second, we assume that all forms of parental resources matter equally for a child￿ s ability.
In fact, earned and unearned income may be associated with di⁄erent e⁄ects: if parents
work more, they will have more resources but may have fewer hours to spend investing in
their children, whereas increases in unearned income may more unambiguously increase child
ability. Implicitly, this assumption is similar to assuming either that the allocation of parental
8time has no e⁄ect on children￿ s abilities, or that parents who adjust their work hours hold
constant the time allocated to developing their children￿ s abilities and o⁄set that adjustment
with time spent on other leisure. Again, in making this assumption, we are guided not only
by tractability but also by the data: The empirical evidence we have concerns the e⁄ect
on a child￿ s ability of transfers to parents through the tax system; we have no data on the
separate e⁄ect of these factors on child outcomes. Moreover, Gelber and Michell (2012) ￿nd
no evidence that parental time with children (as the primary activity) is a⁄ected by single
mothers￿increase in work hours due to EITC expansions.
Third, only tax policy is modeled in this paper, but that does not imply that other
policies play no role. Our empirical estimates take as given the existing set of non-tax
policies and institutions, such as schools, that have e⁄ects on children￿ s abilities (including
e⁄ects that interact with the tax system). Our model implicitly assumes that these policies
and institutions are held constant as taxes vary, again an assumption we make to match the
empirical evidence to which we calibrate the model.
Fourth, in the terminology of Becker and H. Gregg Lewis (1973), we assume that quality
of children is valued and a⁄ected by parental resources, but we abstract from the e⁄ect of
resources on the quantity of children. Valuing new lives is beyond the scope of this paper,
and empirical work has produced inconsistent evidence on the e⁄ect of tax policy on fertility.
Finally, we do not constrain parent and child distributions of ability to be the same, as
they might be in some steady state. Again, we are motivated by the data: wage distributions
have shown secular time trends in the data across generations (e.g. Claudia Goldin and
Lawrence Katz 2007), and test scores have secularly increased over time as in the well-known
"Flynn e⁄ect" (e.g. James Flynn 1987).
2 Analysis of optimal policy
Our analysis of the planner￿ s problem in expressions (1) through (4) generates two results.
First, we characterize the optimal distortion to an individual￿ s choice of how much to earn,
the classic subject of optimal tax analyses since Mirrlees (1971). Second, we derive a nec-
essary condition on optimal allocations across generations that modi￿es the conventional
9model￿ s recommendation in an intuitive but powerful way.
2.1 Optimal marginal distortion to earned income
The classic object of study in optimal tax models is the marginal tax rate, or the distortion
to the individual￿ s marginal choice between disposable income and leisure. Formally, the
ratio v0 ￿
yk
t+s=wk
t+s
￿
=[wk
t+su0 ￿
ck
t+s
￿
] equals one if an individual sets the marginal disutility of
labor equal to the marginal utility of consuming the income that labor earns. Any factor
reducing the marginal utility of earnings (such as a positive marginal tax rate) causes this
ratio to be less than one, distorting the individual￿ s optimal choice of labor e⁄ort.
In the model above, in the absence of taxes, parent i chooses to satisfy:
v0 (yi
t=wi
t)
wi
tu0 (ci
t)
= 1 + ￿
X
j
@pj (wi
t;ci
t)
@ci
t
U
j
t+1
u0 (ci
t)
: (5)
In words, parents take into account the e⁄ect of their disposable income on their child￿ s
ability, so they will appear to choose labor supply as though there were a marginal subsidy
equal to the second term on the right-hand side of expression (5), relative to a model in
which they took only their own disposable income into account. Recall that the right-hand
side equals one in a conventional model without endogenous ability distributions.
Lemma 1 (proved in the Appendix) establishes that the planner￿ s ￿rst-order conditions
for ci
t+s and yi
t+s imply a distortion to a parent￿ s private choice.8
Lemma 1 Optimal Intratemporal Distortion: Let ￿ denote the multiplier on (2) and ￿
i0ji
+￿
denote the multiplier on (3): The solution to the Planner￿ s Problem satis￿es:
v0 ￿
y
j
t+s=w
j
t+s
￿
w
j
t+su0 ￿
c
j
t+s
￿ = A
j
t+s
￿
B
j
t+s + Ct+s
￿
￿
B
j
t+s + Dt+s
￿
 
1 + ￿
X
k
@pk ￿
w
j
t+s;c
j
t+s
￿
@c
j
t+s
Uk
t+s+1
u0 ￿
c
j
t+s
￿
!
(6)
where
A
j
t+s =
1
1 ￿ ￿
P
k
@pk(w
j
t+s;c
j
t+s)
@c
j
t+s
Rk
t+s+1
; (7)
8It is important to be clear about our terminology. By "distorting" the parent￿ s choice, we mean simply
that the condition characterizing the planner￿ s ￿rst-order condition (6) is di⁄erent than the condition (5)
characterizing the parent￿ s choice.
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j
t+s = ￿
s￿
j
t+s +
s￿1 X
￿=0
￿
s￿￿ X
i
X
i0
￿
i0ji
t+￿
￿
￿
j
t+sjci
t+￿ ￿ ￿
j
t+sjci0
t+￿
￿
; (8)
Ct+s =
X
j0
￿
j0jj
t+s ￿
X
j0
￿
jjj0
t+s; (9)
Dt+s =
X
j0
￿
j0jj
t+s ￿
1
w
j0
t+s
v0
￿
y
j
t+s
w
j0
t+s
￿
1
w
j
t+s
v0
￿
y
j
t+s
w
j
t+s
￿
X
j0
￿
jjj0
t+s; (10)
where ￿
j
t+sjci
t+￿ is the probability that a generation (t + s) descendant of parent type i from
generation t+￿ is of type j and
P
i ￿
j
t+sjci
t+￿ is denoted by the unconditional probability ￿
j
t+s:
Lemma 1 shows that the product A
j
t+s
(B
j
t+s+Ct+s)
(B
j
t+s+Dt+s) is the optimal wedge distorting the
parent￿ s choice of earned income. This distortion can be divided into two components: a
wedge present in a conventional model and a new wedge due to endogenous ability.
In a conventional model, parental resources have no e⁄ect on children￿ s abilities, so
@pk ￿
w
j
t+s;c
j
t+s
￿
=@c
j
t+s = 0. If this is true, expressions (7) and (8) imply that A
j
t+s = 1
and B
j
t+s = ￿
s￿
j
t+s. In that case, the optimal distortion is driven by binding incentive
constraints in the current generation. Then, the ratio
￿
B
j
t+s + Ct+s
￿
=
￿
B
j
t+s + Dt+s
￿
yields
the conventional optimal marginal income tax rate at income yi
t. Note that Ct+s< Dt+s when
higher-skilled types are tempted to mimic lower-skilled types, so this ratio is less than one
in a conventional model, which implies a positive marginal tax rate.
In the model with endogenous future ability, A
j
t+s and B
j
t+s take more complicated values
and a⁄ect the optimal distortion to income, as shown in expressions (7) and (8). The terms
Ct+s and Dt+s are unchanged from the conventional model.
The value of A
j
t+s depends only on the present value of the expected net revenue gain
from raising the disposable income of parent j. The planner values such revenue gains, while
the parent does not. That gain is the weighted sum of net revenues obtained across types
over time, with the weight on type k in generation t + s + 1 representing the increase in
probability that children of parent type j will have type k when c
j
t+s is increased slightly.
Intuitively, larger A
j
t+s means that the planner generates greater net revenue gain from
having the parent obtain a larger disposable income. Note that this e⁄ect holds whether or
not incentive constraints bind, as A
j
t+s simply multiplies the right-hand side of (6). Therefore,
11optimal policy entails a smaller distortion to parent j￿ s e⁄ort, encouraging the parent to earn
more and thus retain greater disposable income.
The value of B
j
t+s measures how an increase in c
j
t+s a⁄ects the incentive problems of taxing
earlier generations who can a⁄ect the probability that their generation-(t + s) descendants
have the type j. For example, suppose type j is a high skill type, so that if type i is higher
than i0 in generation t, ￿
j
t+sjci
t+￿ > ￿
j
t+sjci0
t+￿, ￿
i0ji
t+￿ > 0, and ￿
iji0
t+￿ = 0: Then, B
j
t+s is larger for
high-skilled types in a model with endogenous ability than in a model without endogenous
ability. This force decreases the optimal distortion to the high-skilled individual￿ s private
optimum. Intuitively, we should decrease the marginal distortion on type j if doing so reduces
earlier generations￿incentive problems. A similar logic holds if j is a low-skilled type. Then,
￿
j
t+sjci
t+￿ < ￿
j
t+sjci0
t+￿ while ￿
i0ji
t+￿ > 0, and ￿
iji0
t+￿ = 0, so that B
j
t+s is smaller for low-skilled
types in a model with endogenous ability than in a model without. Intuitively, a smaller
distortion on a low-skilled type raises the temptation for previous generations to work less
and produce low-skilled descendants. Thus, larger distortions are required on low-skilled
types when these intergenerational connections are introduced.
In the end, the sign of the e⁄ect of this form of endogenous ability on optimal distortions
is ambiguous. To get a sense for this ambiguity, consider the case of a low-ability parent. If
parental resources have greater marginal e⁄ects on the chlidren of low-skilled parents, then
A is likely to be high for these parents, reducing the optimal distortion. At the same time,
B is likely to be small because increasing this low-skilled parent￿ s resources makes it harder
to incentivize previous generations to work hard, increasing the optimal distortion. On net,
the optimal distortion could be smaller or larger than in the conventional model.
Further intuition can be obtained by examining the case of only two ability types￿ the case
we will consider in the numerical simulations below due to the limitations of the available
data. In the case of two ability types, only one of the incentive constraints will bind within
any given generation, allowing us to write result (6) more concisely for each ability type. We
provide those expressions in the Appendix.
122.2 Allocations across generations
We now turn to analyzing intertemporal allocations. In a conventional model, the planner￿ s
￿rst-order condition for c
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Summing across types and combining with the same condition for generation t + s + 1
immediately yields a condition on allocations across generations.
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This condition, parallel to the Symmetric Inverse Euler Equation in Weinzierl (2011), shows
that the optimal allocation equalizes the cost, in disposable income units, of raising social
welfare across generations. A version of it also applies to optimal tagging, such as in N.
Gregory Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010).
With endogenous ability, expression (11) may not hold. Instead, a modi￿ed version of it
applies, which we state in the following proposition and derive in the Appendix.9
Proposition 1 The solution to the Planner￿ s Problem satis￿es
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In words, this proposition re￿ ects that the true cost of raising social welfare through
allocating disposable income to each generation depends on more than just the marginal
utilities of disposable income of that generation￿ s members. In particular, if extra resources
granted to the current generation result in increased output and, therefore, tax revenue from
9Note that results (11) and (12) will hold for the special case in which consumption for each type and
the ability distribution across types are exactly constant, regardless of whether the corresponding allocation
is optimal from a welfare standpoint. Thus, these results are necessary but not su¢ cient qualities of the
optimal policies (without and with endogenous ability, respectively).
13future generations, or if they result in increased utilities for future generations, then the cost
of raising social welfare is lower.
More formally, comparing equations (11) and (12), there are two terms that a⁄ect the lat-
ter but not the former. Both terms rely on the e⁄ects of an increase in the disposable income
of an individual in one generation on the ability distribution of that individual￿ s children.
For example, the term ￿
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is the present
value, in disposable income units, of the net increase in utility enjoyed by those same chil-
dren. The greater the values of these terms, the less costly it is to achieve any given increase
in welfare through increases in the earlier generation￿ s disposable income.
The e⁄ects on optimal policy captured by these two terms are theoretically ambiguous;
to build intuition for their e⁄ects, we consider a speci￿c, empirically relevant scenario in the
remainder of Section 2. Namely, suppose that mean ability is stable over time and the e⁄ects
of parental resources on a child￿ s ability are largest at lower skill levels.10 Conventional policy
designed to satisfy the expression (11) would treat generations symmetrically, and those
allocations would satisfy equation (12). But that conventional policy fails to take advantage
of the endogeneity of the ability distribution.
Consider, instead, a policy that transfers resources from generation t+s+1 to generation
t+s and, in particular, increases the resources available to the low-ability workers in gener-
ation t + s. Such a policy would violate the conventional expression (11), as it would lower
the marginal utilities of disposable income for generation t+s and raise them for generation
t+s+1, increasing the left-hand side and decreasing the right-hand side of (11). Intuitively,
the conventional perspective implies that the relative cost of raising welfare under such a
policy is higher in the recipient generation t + s:
Such a policy is consistent with the true optimal policy condition (12), however, because
endogenous ability reduces the true relative cost of raising welfare in the previous generation
t+s. To see this, note that the policy will (inadvertently) increase the population proportions
10Formally, suppose
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14of higher-ability workers in generation t + s + 1. This shift in the distribution of ￿k
t+s+1 will
put greater weights on workers with larger inverse marginal utilities of disposable income
and smaller gains in future revenue and utility for their descendants from marginal resources,
increasing the right-hand side of (12). Intuitively, the true relative cost of raising welfare
through generation t+s+1 is higher than the conventional perspective infers, because that
generation is now higher-skilled and less able to generate further ability increases. Therefore,
equation (12) may be satis￿ed with a policy that treats generations asymmetrically and
generates greater welfare.
This example implies that an optimal policy making use of the endogeneity of the ability
distribution may di⁄er from the conventionally-optimal policy. While result (12) does not
prove that such a superior policy equilibrium exists, the simulations of Section 4 show that
the scenario described above ￿ts the empirical evidence from the United States, and that
the potential welfare gains from the optimal policy are substantial.
3 Model calibration under existing U.S. tax policy
In this section, we calibrate the model of Section 1 to empirical results on the e⁄ect of parental
resources on children￿ s ability under existing U.S. tax policy. We focus our calibration
on matching empirical estimates of statistics related to the transmission of ability across
generations under the status quo tax policy. In particular, we minimize the distance (i.e.
sum of squared deviations) between the model￿ s output and the empirical estimates of the
marginal e⁄ects of parental resources in the ￿rst generation on their children￿ s abilities and
the transition matrix between the ￿rst and second generations of parent and child ability
types.
3.1 Generating empirical estimates of the target statistics
We adapt to our framework the empirical work from a recent major study of parents￿taxes
and children￿ s outcomes. Dahl and Lochner (forthcoming) study the e⁄ect of expansions of
15the EITC in the 1990s on children￿ s test score outcomes.11 Their study examines a speci￿c
context, and we must generalize outside of the speci￿c features of this context with caution.
While recognizing this caveat, we choose to examine this context because we believe that it
represents one of the best available opportunities to study the e⁄ect of tax policy toward
parents on children￿ s outcomes in the United States. We refer readers to their paper for a
full description of their empirical strategy and its motivation, but we brie￿ y describe their
empirical strategy here, often borrowing from their description of it.
The size of the EITC, which is a refundable tax credit primarily bene￿tting low- and
middle-income families, depends on earned income and the number of qualifying children.
The EITC tax schedule has three regions. Over the ￿phase-in￿ range, a percentage of
earnings is transferred to individuals. Over the ￿plateau￿region, an individual receives the
maximum credit, after which the credit is reduced (eventually to zero) in the "phase-out"
region. Near the period studied in this paper, the EITC was expanded substantially in the
tax acts of 1986, 1990, and 1993. The largest expansion of the EITC was in 1993. This
reform increased the additional maximum bene￿t for taxpayers with two or more children,
which reached $1400 in 1996. The phase-in rate for the lowest-income recipients increased
from 18.5% to 34% for families with one child and from 19.5% to 40% for families with two
or more children.
Dahl and Lochner ask how the EITC and other tax and transfer programs a⁄ect the
cognitive achievement of disadvantaged children through their e⁄ects on parental income.
Their estimation strategy is based on the observation that low- to middle-income families
11See Joseph Hotz and Karl Scholz (2003) and Nada Eissa and Hilary Hoynes (2005) for detailed descrip-
tions of the EITC program and a summary of related research. The marginal e⁄ect of parental resources on
child ability is di¢ cult to estimate for at least two reasons. First, it is di¢ cult to ￿nd plausibly exogenous
variation in parents￿disposable income levels. Second, it is di¢ cult to ￿nd data on parents￿disposable
income and wage levels linked to measures of their children￿ s outcomes. Several papers have estimated the
e⁄ect of parents￿income on their children￿ s achievement levels (e.g. Dahl and Lochner forthcoming; Kevin
Milligan and Mark Stabile forthcoming; Christine Paxson and Norbert Schady 2007; Randall Akee, William
Copeland, Gordon Keeler, Adrian Angold, and Jane Costello 2010; Katrine Lłken, Magne Mogstad, and
Matthew Wiswall 2012; Karen Macours, Schady, and Renos Vakis 2012). However, they have not estimated
the e⁄ect of parents￿disposable income on children￿ s wage rates in large part because linking the income
of children￿ s parents when the children were young to children￿ s wage outcomes when they have grown into
adults requires a long panel of data in which all of these variables are linked. This coincidence of data is
unlikely in circumstances with suitable exogenous variation in parents￿disposable income. In fact, our paper
suggests a new empirical object of interest that should be studied in future work: the e⁄ect of parents￿
disposable income on children￿ s wages.
16received large increases in payments from expansions of the EITC in the late-1980s and
mid-1990s but higher income families did not. If parental disposable income a⁄ects child
ability, this disparity in the changes to disposable income should have caused an increase
over time in the test scores of children from low-to-middle income families relative to those
from higher income families.
Dahl and Lochner￿ s analysis uses the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth, which contain data on several thousand children matched to their mothers (from
the main NLSY sample). Income and demographic measures are included in the data, in
addition to as many as ￿ve repeated measures of cognitive test scores per child taken every
other year. The data are longitudinal, implying that it is possible to ￿rst-di⁄erence the
data to remove child ￿xed e⁄ects. They use measures of child ability based on standardized
scores on the Peabody Individual Achievement Tests (PIAT), which measures oral reading
ability, mathematics ability, word recognition ability, and reading comprehension. From
1986 to 2000, the tests were administered every two years to children ages ￿ve and older.
Children took each individual test at most ￿ve times. Dahl and Lochner￿ s instrumental
variables estimates suggest that a $1,000 increase in family income raises math and reading
test scores by about 6% of a standard deviation.12
3.1.1 Regression Speci￿cation
We estimate a model similar to Dahl and Lochner￿ s, using the same basic sample of data
they use (described more fully in their paper and below), but we use it to obtain a slightly
di⁄erent empirical object. Motivated by our model above and simulation below, we estimate
the e⁄ect that income has on the probability that a parent of given ability type produces a
child of a given ability type. Let xi denote observable characteristics, ￿ia denote time-varying
unobserved shocks to the child or family, and cia denote total family disposable income for
child i at age a (where income is measured net of any taxes and transfers, including EITC
payments).13 Child outcomes are denoted wia, which are a function of the child￿ s and parents￿
characteristics and income. ￿sia
a (yia) denotes EITC income, which is a function of pre-tax
12We use year 2000 dollars throughout.
13The subscript i indexes individuals in this section; this should not be confused with the superscript i in
the model in Section 1.
17income, yia. Taxes other than the EITC are denoted T sia
a (Pia). The EITC schedules vary
within a year based on income and number of children, and the EITC schedules also vary
across years. The superscript sia on the EITC and tax functions denotes which schedule a
child￿ s family is on; the tax schedules may vary based upon the number of children in the
household and marital status. Family disposable income is cia = yia + ￿sia
a (yia) ￿ T sia
a (yia):
We use ￿IV
a (yi;a￿1) ￿ ￿
si;a￿1
a ( ^ E[yi:ajyi:a￿1])￿￿
si;a￿1
a￿1 (yi;a￿1) to instrument for the change in
family disposable income from age a ￿ 1 to age a.14 Here ^ E[yi:ajyi:a￿1] represents predicted
pre-tax income at age a conditional on pre-tax income at age a ￿ 1. Following Dahl and
Lochner, in order to calculate ^ E[yi:ajyi:a￿1], we regress pre-tax income on an indicator for
positive lagged pre-tax income and a ￿fth-order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income, and
then we obtain the ￿tted values. As in Jonathan Gruber and Emmanuel Saez (2002), we
predict changes in EITC payments by applying the change in the EITC schedule to predicted
current income, where the prediction is based on lagged pre-tax income. We exploit variation
in predicted EITC income resulting only from policy changes in EITC schedules over time,
as opposed to those resulting from changes in family structure, because we hold the type of
EITC schedule (e.g. one versus two children) ￿xed over time.
As both Gruber and Saez and Dahl and Lochner note, the autoregressive process de-
termining income is likely to include serially correlated income shocks. Using ￿IV
a as an
instrument, without conditioning on lagged income, is therefore likely to yield biased and
inconsistent estimates of the coe¢ cient on parent income. This is because predicted changes
in EITC payments depend on pre-tax family income at age a￿1, namely yi;a￿1, which will be
correlated with the subsequent change in income if, for example, mean reversion character-
izes the evolution of income. Therefore, following Gruber and Saez and Dahl and Lochner,
we control in the regression for a ￿ exible function ￿(yi;a￿1) of yi;a￿1. Like Dahl and Lochner,
we specify this function ￿(yi;a￿1) as an indicator for positive lagged pre-tax income and a
￿fth order polynomial in lagged pre-tax income.
Dahl and Lochner estimate the e⁄ect of parental after-tax income on children￿ s ability,
but in our calibration later, we will be interested in a related but di⁄erent object: the e⁄ect
of parental after-tax income on the probability that a parent of a given ability level has a
14We use "initial period" to refer to child age a ￿ 1 and "￿nal period" to refer to child age a.
18child of a given (possibly di⁄erent) ability level. We adapt the Dahl and Lochner empirical
speci￿cation by estimating the following model:
D
lm
ia = x
0
i￿ + ￿cia￿ + Wi;a￿1￿ + ￿(yi;a￿1) + ￿ia (13)
using ￿IV
a as an instrument for ￿cia. We relate a binary dummy Dlm
ia equal to one when
the child is in ability category l and the parent is in hourly wage category m, to observable
characteristics x (which include child gender, age, and number of siblings), the change in
parental income over the period in question ￿cia, a vector of dummies Wi;a￿1 for whether
the child￿ s lagged ability level (at age a ￿ 1) fell in each of the ability categories, and the
￿ exible function ￿(yi;a￿1) of lagged pre-tax income.15 We run separate a regression for each
parent-child ability pair. In our main speci￿cation, for example, there are two parent types
and two child types, which implies that we estimate four separate regressions, in each of
which the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one when the parent-child ability
pair in question occurs. Intuitively, the coe¢ cient ￿ approximately tells us the e⁄ect of a
100% increase in parental disposable income on the fraction of children ending up in a given
ability category, given that the parent was in a given wage category, and given the child￿ s
initial ability level. By controlling for lagged child ability, we e⁄ectively remove permanent
di⁄erences in child ability levels across families. Thus, our speci￿cation e⁄ectively relates
changes in child ability to (instrumented) changes in parental income, using policy changes
in EITC schedules to predict di⁄erential changes in after-tax family income across families.
We run a linear probability model to estimate (4) because a logit or probit model would lead
to an incidental parameters problem.16
We divide parents into two wage categories (P1 and P2) and divide children into two test
score categories (C1 and C2). Each category comprises one-half of the distribution of wages
or test scores, respectively. The subscript 1 indicates the lower half of the distributions,
15This speci￿cation implicitly makes assumptions that mirror those made in Dahl and Lochner. First,
parental income has an e⁄ect on child ability that is the same at all child ages. Second, conditional on
lagged child ability, lagged changes in income have no e⁄ect on current income.
16Of course, a well-known limitation of linear probability models is that they may predict probabilities
outside of the range [0,1]. We consider estimation of consistent e⁄ects to be the more important consideration,
and thus we estimate a linear probability model rather than a logit or probit. Running a Chamberlain
random e⁄ects ordered probit gives similar results to those shown but entails additional assumptions about
the distribution of the random e⁄ect.
19and the subscript 2 indicates the upper half. In choosing the number of categories, we
take into account competing considerations: more categories will better describe the true
heterogeneity of the population and, therefore, the potential gains from optimal policy; but
too many categories will prevent the regressions in the empirical estimation from having
enough positive values of the dependent variable to yield meaningful results. To illustrate
this tradeo⁄, in the Appendix, we show results with three categories. Those results show
heterogeneity in tax rates at a ￿ner level of disaggregation at the cost of a substantial loss
of power in the empirical estimates. The results with three types show broadly similar
patterns to the results with two types, though the impacts of the optimal policy on the
ability distribution and welfare are substantially larger than in the two-type baseline case.
The NLSY has not yet generally followed a su¢ cient number of children to an age when
they can be observed participating in the labor force with their post-schooling wage, so
we follow Dahl and Lochner in using child test scores as a measure of child ability.17 We
control for the child￿ s initial test score category (i.e. upper or lower half), but the results
are very similar when we instead control for linear or higher-order terms in the child￿ s initial
test score. We have measured parent wage category using their wages at the beginning of
the sample period, so that their wages are not a⁄ected by subsequent EITC variation. To
calculate the hourly wage, we divide earnings by hours worked for NLSY survey respondents.
Over 99% of respondents are mothers.18
Our sample of children is constructed as Dahl and Lochner construct their sample, as
described presently. The sample contains children observed in at least two consecutive even-
numbered survey years between 1988 and 2000 with valid scores, family background char-
acteristics, and family income measures. Our sample follows children over this period. We
calculate each family￿ s state and federal EITC payment and tax burden using the TAXSIM
program (version 9) (Daniel Feenberg and Elizabeth Coutts, 1993). We also limit our sample
to children whose mothers did not change marital status during two-year intervals when test
17Our calibration therefore assumes that child test scores translate into hourly wages, as models of wage
determination predict.
18The number of observations in our regressions is somewhat smaller than the number of observations in
the baseline sample in Dahl and Lochner. Some respondents do not work in the initial period, implying that
their hourly wage is unobserved. We drop these individuals from the sample, so that our sample consists
only of working individuals.
20scores are measured. Our main sample includes 3,714 interviewed children born to 2,108
interviewed mothers, with children observed 2.9 times on average.
As we discuss later, the formal model whose moments we will match to the data will be
speci￿ed in terms of the e⁄ect of log parental income on child ability. Thus, it is useful for us
to estimate the e⁄ect of log parental income on child ability, and ideally ￿cia would represent
the change in log parental income over the period in question. However, estimating exactly
this speci￿cation would lead to a problem: the log of zero is unde￿ned, but we would like
to include individuals in the regressions whose parents may have had income of zero in the
￿nal period. Thus, we approximate log income using the inverse hyperbolic sine of income.
The inverse hyperbolic sine approximates the log function but is de￿ned at zero values (e.g.
see similar work in Karen Pence 2006 or Alexander Gelber 2011).19 It is important to
emphasize that our results are similar when we use several alternative speci￿cations: a linear
speci￿cation (which is less compatible with our formal model but which allows us to include
zero values of parental income); a speci￿cation in which we add 1 to income before logging
it (which clearly allows us to log income, at the cost of adding an arbitrary value to income
before logging it); and a speci￿cation in which we simply log income and discard observations
in which income is zero (whose sample size is substantially reduced from the sample size we
use in our regressions).
Appendix Table 1 shows summary statistics. Children￿ s mean age is 11.31 years old.
Nearly half of the children are male. Respondents work a mean of 1,692.68 hours per year.
The mean calculated hourly wage is $8.16/hour. The probability that a high-wage parent
has a high-ability child, and the probability that a low-wage parent has a low-ability child, is
26.9%. The probability that a low-wage parent has a high-ability child, and the probability
that a high-wage parent has a low-ability child, is 23.1%.
19The inverse hyperbolic sine of A is de￿ned as sinh
￿1(A) = ln(A +
p
1 + A2). The change in parental
income ￿cia is therefore de￿ned as ￿cia = sinh
￿1(cia)￿sinh
￿1(cia￿1), where cia￿1 represents parent income
when the child was age a ￿ 1. A more general form of the inverse hyperbolic sine function adds a scaling
parameter; our results are similar when we use other scaling parameters.
213.1.2 Empirical Results
As a preliminary step, we ￿rst consider a simpli￿ed empirical exercise designed to test the
viability of our approach. In Appendix Table 2, we show the results of a regression in which
the dependent variable is binary, taking the value of 1 when the child has an above-median
score in the ￿nal period and a value of 0 when the child has a below-median score in the ￿nal
period.20 Increases in parental disosable income increase the dependent variable positively
and signi￿cantly (at the 1% level). The point estimate shows that a 1% increase in parental
income causes an increase in the probability that the child is in the high ability category of
0.665 percentage points, an economically meaningful impact. Evaluating this at the mean
of parental income ($30,598.22), this point estimate implies that a $1,000 increase in parent
income causes an increase in the probability that the child is in the high ability category of
2.19 percentage points, which represents a moderate-sized impact that makes sense in light
of the moderate impacts that Dahl and Lochner found in their paper.
Having demonstrated that we are relying on useful variation in the data, we show the
main empirical results in Table 1. We show the results of four separate regressions, each one
corresponding to a binary dependent variable de￿ned by one of the four possible combinations
of parent and child ability categories. For each regression, we show the estimated e⁄ect ￿
and its standard error in parentheses.
Table 1: Empirical marginal e⁄ects of parental resources
on child ability distribution (percentage points)
(1) Child category 1 (2) Child category 2
(A) Parent category 1 -0.036 0.688
(0.249) (0.284)**
(B) Parent category 2 -0.646 -0.007
(0.321)** (0.206)
20The right-hand-side of this regression is identical to the main regression speci￿cation (13) above. We
control in Appendix Table 2 for a binary dummy measuring whether the lagged child test score is above or
below the median (rather than terciles of lagged child ability).
22Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the parent is in a given hourly wage
category and the child is also in a given ability category (which is potentially di⁄erent from the parent￿ s
ability category). The child￿ s ability is measured by their test scores on math and reading components of
the PIAT, as described in the text and in Dahl and Lochner (forthcoming). The categories are halves of
the distribution (of wages or ability for parents and children, respectively), with category 1 constituting the
lower half of the values and category 2 constituting the larger half of the values. Parent wage is measured at
the beginning of the sample period, and child test score is measured at the end of each sample period. This
binary variable is regressed on the change in the parent￿ s net-of-tax income (instrumented using the change
in the parent￿ s net-of-tax income predicted using lagged income), a ￿fth-order polynomial in lagged income,
an indicator for positive lagged income, gender, age, number of siblings, and dummies for each child￿ s lagged
test score category. Four separate regressions are run corresponding to each of four possible combinations
of two child categories and two parent categories used to form the dependent variable. The number of
observations in each regression is 6,902, corresponding to 2,108 mothers and 3,714 children. The table shows
the coe¢ cient, with the standard error below in parentheses, for each of the four regressions. Parent income
is measured in 1,000￿ s of year 2000 dollars. To approximate the log functional form, we take the inverse
hyperbolic sine of income in each period before we ￿rst-di⁄erence it, so that we approximately estimate the
e⁄ect of log income on the dependent variable, as described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the
level of the mother.
Two of the four coe¢ cient estimates in Table 2 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at
the 5% level: parental income has a negative (as expected), substantial, and statistically
signi￿cant impact on the probability that a high-ability parent has a low-ability child, and
parental income has a positive (as expected), substantial, and statistically signi￿cant impact
on the probability that a low-ability parent has a high-ability child. The point estimates are
moderate-sized and reasonable. They show that a 1% increase in parental income causes a
0.688 percentage point increase in the probability that a parent in the low ability category has
a child in the high ability category, and that a 1% increase in parental income causes a 0.646
percentage point decrease in the probability that a parent in the high ability category has a
child in the low ability category. Evaluating these point estimates at the mean of parental
income, they imply that a $1,000 increase in parental income causes a 2.25 percentage point
increase in the probability that a parent in the low ability category has a child in the high
ability category, and that a $1,000 increase in parental income causes a 2.11 percentage point
decrease in the probability that a parent in the high ability category has a child in the low
ability category.
The estimates in Table 1 provide four of the statistics targeted by our calibration. The
23remaining targets are the elements of the empirical ability transition matrix across genera-
tions. Using the same dataset and de￿nition of types as in the analysis just described, we
can readily generate that matrix by calculating the fraction of the sample from each parent
wage category who began the sample period with the child test score in each category. The
results are in Table 2.
Table 2: Empirical ability transition matrix
(1) Child category 1 (2) Child category 2
(A) Parent category 1 0.538 0.462
(B) Parent category 2 0.462 0.538
3.2 Model speci￿cation
We next describe how the model produces quantities corresponding to these target statistics,
and we specify some components of the model required for simulation.
The quantities corresponding to the targeted statistics are generated by the model as
follows. In the planner￿ s problem, the production function for a child￿ s ability was left
unspeci￿ed. Here, we impose a particular, tractable form:21 the expected ability of the child
of a parent of type j with disposable income c
j0
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Expression (14) shows that the child￿ s expected ability is a function of a constant, the
parent￿ s ability, a ￿xed "mean" ability, and the parent￿ s disposable income. The child￿ s
expected ability is in￿ uenced by the parent￿ s ability w
j
1 relative to the ￿xed ability level ￿ w,
indicating mean reversion in characteristics transmitted across generations (consistent with
the empirical evidence on income, e.g. Steven Haider and Gary Solon 2006).
This log-linear functional form concisely captures the basic forces at work in the trans-
mission of ability across generations. Namely, it allows us to adjust the role of parental
21In (14) and elsewhere, in the model speci￿cation we make several assumptions for the sake of tractability.
This fact notwithstanding, we view our model speci￿cation and calibration as demonstration that taking into
account the e⁄ect of parents￿resources on children￿ s abilities can have important implications for optimal
tax policy.
24ability in determining a child￿ s ability through the parameter ￿. It also allows us to vary the
relative importance of this channel and a second channel, parental resources, by adjusting
the parameters ￿i and ￿j
c. Note that the dependence of ￿c, the parameter controlling the
importance of parental disposable income, on j, the parental ability type, establishes a di-
rect connection between the exogenous and endogenous components of the ability production
function.22
We translate the expected ability in expression (14) into an ability distribution for the
population of children of parents of type j with disposable income c
j0
1 by assuming that
ability is distributed lognormally with variance ￿2 :
lnw2 ￿ N
￿
E
h
lnw2jw
j
1;c
j0
1
i
;￿
2
￿
: (15)
The variance ￿2 represents an exogenous, stochastic shock to child ability common across
parent types.
Expressions (14) and (15) indicate that the model calibration will search over values of the
following six parameters:
n
￿;￿;￿i;f￿j
cg
I
j=1 ;￿
o
. As a baseline case, we will impose ￿ = 0:5
for the parameter controlling the transmission of ability across generations. This assumption
is based on the voluminous evidence surveyed in Feldman, Otto, and Christiansen 2000.23
We investigate the robustness of our results to this choice in the Appendix. This leaves ￿ve
parameters to be chosen.
Given this setup, we can generate the model￿ s values of the targeted statistics as follows.
Transition probabilities ￿k
t+1jc
j
t are calculated by ￿nding the positions of the (￿xed) children￿ s
ability types within the parent-speci￿c distributions (15) for each parent type. The marginal
e⁄ects of parental disposable income are calculated as the increase in the probability of a
given child type caused by an increase of one percent in a given parent type￿ s disposable
22We do not estimate this production function directly using our empirical approach because our empirical
approach relies on a ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation, which would di⁄erence out parent ability. Our regression
speci￿cation estimates a coe¢ cient on parental income that is comparable to the coe¢ cient on parental
income in (14):
23Feldman et al. ￿nd a range of heritability estimates from 0.28 to 0.38 (their h2) and a "cultural trans-
mission" estimate (their b2) of 0.27 (see their Table 4.3). The mapping between these channels and our
"ability" channel is imperfect. The two channels together could explain nearly two-thirds of the variance in
a characteristic. But while all of the former channel is contained with our notion of "ability," it is not clear
that all of the latter is so contained. We use 0.50 as a reasonable middle ground.
25income.24
Finally, before proceeding with the calibration, we specify the tax system facing individ-
uals, the utility function those individuals maximize, and the ability types they may take.
For the status quo tax system, we assume that the Kotliko⁄and Rapson (2007) calculations
of marginal e⁄ective tax rates on income for 30-year-old couples in the United States in 2005
are a good approximation of the status quo tax policy facing parents of young children.25
These authors￿detailed calculations go well beyond statutory personal income tax schedules
and include a wide array of transfer programs (such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid,
Food Stamps, and low-income bene￿t programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit) as
well as corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, and state and local income and sales taxes.
Their estimates are shown in Figure 1 (from Kotliko⁄ and Rapson 2007):
24Formally, we calculate the di⁄erence between the cumulative density of a given child type when the mean
of the child￿ s type is E [lnw] + 0:01￿j
c and when it is E [lnw].
25In the simulations, we suppress the ￿rst marginal tax rate shown in Figure 1 (by setting it equal to
the second marginal tax rate), as the value of 235% can cause problems for the numerical optimization by
generating negative disposable income values from positive earned incomes. Negative disposable income
values generate a non-monotonic marginal utility of disposable income, with that marginal utility unde￿ned
at zero. The results of our simulations are una⁄ected by this change, as this marginal tax rate is inframarginal
for all workers in the simulation.
26Figure 1: E⁄ective marginal tax rate in the U.S.
Within each generation, the government also makes a grant to all individuals, and these
grants may di⁄er across generations due to variation in aggregate earnings. As in the fea-
sibility constraint on the planner, expression (2), the government￿ s budget is balanced in
present value, where we set ￿ = 1:00, re￿ ecting no discounting of utility across generations.
In the Appendix, we show that our results are robust to a modest degree of discounting, but
note that there is no growth in this economy, so any discounting re￿ ects solely a preference
for the utility of earlier generations.
The individual utility function takes a separable, isoelastic form
U
i
t =
(ci
t)
1￿￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
yi
t
wi
t
￿￿
;
where ￿ controls the concavity of utility from disposable income, ￿ controls the elasticity of
labor supply, and ￿ is a taste parameter a⁄ecting the level of labor e⁄ort. Again, we choose
this functional form for the sake of tractability and because it helps in illustrating the key
27features of the model in a straightforward way. We set ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 3 to be consistent
with mainstream estimates of these parameters (which implies that the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply is 1
2). We choose ￿ = 2:5 so that hours worked in the simulation approximately
match the average labor supply in the population.26
Finally, guided by the empirical analysis discussed above, we assume ability comes in
two ￿xed types (roughly interpretable as the hourly wage):27 wi
t 2 f6:94; 12:95g for all
t = f1;2;:::;Tg. The probability distribution across those types is uniform in the ￿rst
generation but is endogenously determined in the model for subsequent generations.
3.3 Calibration Results
Table 3 shows the parameter values chosen by the simulation.
Table 3: Parameters estimated by simulation
Parameter ￿ ￿i ￿1
c ￿2
c ￿
Value under status quo policy 0.07 0.63 0.63 0.46 0.72
Recall that ￿i and ￿j
c are the weights on the two channels, ability and economic resources,
through which parents a⁄ect their child￿ s ability. To aid in building intuition for these values,
rewrite expression (14) as follows:
exp
￿
E
￿
lnw2jw
j
1;c
j
1
￿￿
= 1:07
￿
w
j
1
￿￿i￿
(￿ w)
￿i(1￿￿) ￿
c
j
1
￿￿
j
c ; (16)
where 1:07 = exp(￿). The product of ￿ and ￿i gives the weight on parental ability in expected
child ability, while ￿j
c gives the (parental type-speci￿c) weight on parental resources. The
values of ￿j
c in Table 3 suggest that parental resources play a greater role among low-ability
26That is, e⁄ort comprises approximately 40 percent of available time in the simulation. If the maximum
hours sustainably available for work are approximately 80 per week, this yields total hours of work around
1600 hours per year. The value of ￿ is unimportant for the results of interest in our analysis: a simulation
with ￿ = 2:5 yields lower labor e⁄ort as a share of total time but nearly the identical ￿j
c parameter values
and welfare gain from the optimal policy.
27These values are the mean reported wages for below-median and above-median wages in the NLSY
sample we use.
28parents, consistent with the empirical evidence (since ￿1
c > ￿2
c).28 Key moments determining
the estimates of the ￿j
c are the coe¢ cients on parent income in determining child ability from
Table 1. Key moments determining both the estimates of the ￿j
c and the estimate of ￿i are
the elements of the transition matrix of parent ability to child ability in Table 2, as these
determine the combined role that parent ability and parent resources play in determining
child ability.
Table 4 shows how the output of the model simulations under the status quo tax policy
compares to the empirical estimates of the statistics shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 4. Transition matrices and marginal e⁄ects
Data Status quo policy
Child Child
Parent 1 2 Parent 1 2
Transition 1 0.538 0.462 1 0.538 0.462
matrix 2 0.462 0.538 2 0.462 0.538
Parent 1 2 Parent 1 2
Marginal e⁄ect of c 1 -0.0004 0.0069 1 -0.0035 0.0035
on child ability 2 -0.0065 -0.0001 2 -0.0026 0.0026
The simulation does well in matching the empirical targets. The model￿ s transition
matrix is especially well-matched to the data. The calibration is able to match the sign of
the marginal e⁄ect in three of the four cases and, most important, in both of the statistically-
signi￿cant (from Table 1) o⁄-diagonal elements.29
28Dahl and Lochner (forthcoming), Milligan and Stabile (2008), Paxson and Schady (2007), Akee et al.
(2010), and Lłken, Mogstad, and Wiswall (2012) ￿nd a larger e⁄ect of parental income on child achievement
among lower-income families than among higher-income families. Consistent with these ￿ndings, we ￿nd
that within each parent ability level the e⁄ect of parental income on child achievement is concave.
29Note that the assumption of two types forces the marginal e⁄ects of parental resources to be equal and
of opposite sign for each parent across the two types of children.
294 Optimal Policy
In this section, we simulate a many-period version of the planner￿ s problem using the cal-
ibration from the previous subsection. We characterize optimal policy by comparing it to
the status quo policy used in that calibration. To illustrate the forces a⁄ecting the optimal
policy, we use ten generations, and we show robustness to this choice in the Appendix.
First, Table 5 shows average and marginal tax rates for each type under the optimal and
status quo policies.30 Average tax rates are calculated as the ratio (y ￿ c)=y. For marginal
tax rates, we compare the marginal rates imposed by the status quo policy to the marginal
tax rates that would implement the optimal allocation. The latter are the wedges that
distort individuals￿choices of labor e⁄ort. In the discussion of Lemma 1, we showed that
the wedge for parent of type i in generation t, which we denote as ￿i
t, can be written as
￿i
t = 1￿Ak
t
￿
Bk
t + Ct
￿
=
￿
Bk
t + Dt
￿
, where Ak
t; Bk
t; Ct; and Dt are de￿ned above in expressions
(7); (8), (9); and (10): Table 5 shows the results.
Table 5. Marginal and average tax rates
Marginal tax rate Average tax rate
Type Optimal Status Quo Optimal Status Quo
Low 11% 25% -34% -11%
High -17% 40% 13% 6%
Table 5 shows how the optimal policy di⁄ers from the status quo. It is substantially more
redistributive, generating large transfers to low-skilled parents. Intuitively, the optimal policy
wants these parents to have higher after-tax incomes because those resources translate into
higher ability for their children, while leaving high-ability parents with less after-tax income
has only weak e⁄ects on their children￿ s abilities. Making these large transfers, however,
tempts the high-ability parents (of both the current and prior generations) to work less, so
the optimal policy imposes negative marginal distortions at high incomes to encourage high-
skilled workers to earn high incomes. These distortions make the allocation for lower types
less attractive to those with high ability (who expect to have children with higher ability on
30These hold for all but the initial and ￿nal generations, which di⁄er slightly given their endpoint status.
30average).
The optimal policy also adjusts intertemporal allocations to capitalize on the endogeneity
of ability. Table 6 reports the di⁄erence between the planner￿ s "budget balance" as a share
of aggregate income in each generation under the optimal policy and under the status quo
policy. In other words, it is the additional average tax rate assessed on each generation by
the planner, relative to a balanced budget as assumed to hold in the status quo.
Table 6. Intertemporal allocations
Economy￿ s budget balance
(as percent of output)
Generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Optimal - Status Quo -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9
Table 6 shows that the optimal policy borrows from future generations to fund greater
investment in the skills of the current generation relative to the status quo, which we assume
treats all generations similarly. Of course, our model abstracts from many features of the
economy, notably capital as a factor of production, some of which may make de￿cit-￿nanced
investment in children less appealing. However, the key point illustrated by Table 6 is that
society can bene￿t by having later generations contribute, through higher taxes, to improving
the ability distribution generated by earlier generations.31
These di⁄erences in tax policy a⁄ect the evolution of the ability distribution. We report
the transition matrices for types across generations under the optimal and status quo policies.
Table 7 repeats the transition matrix from Table 2 for the status quo model between the
￿rst and second generations. It also shows the comparable transition matrix for the optimal
31The United States is running substantial yearly budget de￿cits as of 2012 and did in 2005 when the
Kotliko⁄ and Rapson tax rates are calculated. Our "status quo policy" abstracts from this issue.
31policy.
Table 7. Transition matrices
Optimal policy Status quo policy
Child Child
Parent 1 2 Parent 1 2
1 0.496 0.504 1 0.538 0.462
2 0.434 0.566 2 0.462 0.538
The optimal policy enables a greater share of the children of low-skilled parents to move up
the skill ladder than does the status quo policy. The optimal policy also allows a slightly
greater share of the children of high-skilled parents to obtain high skills as well, so the
overall mean of ability shifts up. Intuitively, Tables 6 and 7 show that the optimal policy
takes resources from high-skilled parents and later generations to support low-skilled parents
and earlier generations. This moves resources from those for whom the e⁄ect of resources
on a child￿ s ability is low to those for whom they have substantial value (that is, in the
context of Table 4￿ s estimates, ￿2
c < ￿1
c), and it supports the maintenance of a higher ability
distribution over time.
As these transition matrices imply, the evolution of the ability distribution is di⁄erent
under the optimal and the status quo policies. Figure 2 shows the ability distribution
over time under the two policies. This ￿gure shows the substantial shift toward a higher
ability distribution under the optimal policy that results from the greater progressivity of
the optimal policy; the optimal policy leads to 3.5 percent fewer individuals of the low type
and 3.5 percent more individuals of the high type. Figure 2 also shows that the shift in the
ability distribution is accomplished almost entirely between the ￿rst and second generations
and is persistent in future periods.
32Figure 2: Ability under status quo policy (solid-￿lled columns) and
optimal policy (dot-￿lled columns).
Welfare is much higher under the optimal policy, and it is more equitably distributed. In
fact, the welfare gain of moving from the status quo policy to the optimal policy is large: it is
equivalent to a 6.4% permanent increase in disposable income. But this gain is explained by
more than simply the e⁄ect of policy on the ability distribution. In particular, the optimal
policy￿ s Utilitarian foundation tends to value equality, so the greater redistribution to low-
skilled parents under the optimal policy than under the status quo policy generates a large
increase in welfare. Because we may be interested in the importance of the endogenous ability
channel alone in generating welfare gains, we consider the following thought experiment.
Suppose that the status quo model were granted the distribution of abilities generated by
the optimal model for all generations; we call this the "adjusted status quo." Suppose further
that we hold ￿xed the utility levels of all individuals in the status quo model, but we calculate
the total welfare for the economy given the adjusted status quo ability distributions. This
will generate a greater level of welfare. Now, returning to the status quo tax policy￿ s ability
distributions, we calculate the factor by which disposable income would have to rise in the
33status quo model to reach the welfare of the adjusted status quo. This factor is a measure of
the welfare gain due solely to the optimal policy￿ s e⁄ects on the ability distribution over time.
Similar factors can be calculated for each type of ￿rst-generation parent, as well, indicating
how the welfare gains through this channel are shared. Table 8 shows the results for the
baseline case of ten generations.
Table 8. Welfare
Welfare (in utils) Welfare Gain
Type Status quo policy Adjusted status quo (Percent of disposable income)
Low 6.813 6.845 1.30%
High 6.926 6.957 1.27%
Overall 6.869 6.901 1.28%
As these results show, the optimal policy has the potential to generate a welfare gain equiv-
alent of more than one percent of aggregate disposable income simply by shifting the ability
distribution over time.32 The gains are slightly larger among low-skilled parents, as would be
expected, but high-skilled parents gain nearly as much from the more e¢ cient tax system,
as the e¢ ciency gains and greater equality accruing to future generations raise the current
generation￿ s present-value welfare. Gains for future generations follow the same patterns.
In the Appendix, we explore the robustness of these baseline results to variation in time
discounting, the number of generations, the assumed persistence of type across generations,
and the number of types. Though the results change somewhat when we vary these factors,
the main qualitative and quantitative lessons of the baseline analysis persist. In particular,
optimal policy that takes advantage of endogenous ability is more redistributive than the
status quo, generates an upward shift in the ability distribution, and generates a sizeable
welfare gain equivalent to approximately one percent of aggregate income.
We do ￿nd one more dramatic result however, when we allow for three types of agents.
While we consider our results from the two-type case to be our most solid, as the statistical
32The Appendix shows substantially larger welfare gains if we expand the simulation to three wages types.
We use two wage types as the baseline simulation because we have more con￿dence in the empirical results
for two types.
34signi￿cance of the empirical estimates is greatly diminished in the cases with three (or more)
types, with three types of parents and children the welfare gains from reform are much larger
than in the baseline: i.e., around six percent of total income. Intuitively, the high wage
earners in the three-type case provide a large source of funds for redistribution to the lower-
and medium-skilled workers￿families. These results suggest that increasing the number of
types beyond three could increase the welfare gains still further. All of our results, then￿
both in the two-and three-type cases, and across the other robustness checks we perform￿ we
conclude that the available data suggest that the welfare gains are at least approximately
1% of consumption.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore one aspect of the policy problem relating to equalizing the dis-
tribution of individuals￿economic outcomes or equalizing the distribution of opportunities:
when poor parents have more disposable income, their children￿ s performance improves and
they have greater opportunity to succeed. An optimal tax policy will take advantage of
this relationship to shape the ability distribution over time. But exactly how it will do so
depends on complex interactions between natural ability and the returns to investment in
human capital. Ours is the ￿rst paper we know of to model this complexity and derive policy
implications.
We characterize conditions describing optimal tax policy when children￿ s abilities depend
on both inherited characteristics and parental (￿nancial) resources. If the ability distribution
is stable under an existing policy and the e⁄ect of parental resources is largest for the poor,
these results imply that an optimal policy may be more redistributive toward low-ability
parents and earlier generations than would be a standard optimal tax policy that ignores
the e⁄ect of a parent￿ s disposable income on a child￿ s ability.
We calibrate our model to microeconometric evidence on the transmission of skills and
new estimates of the e⁄ects of increases in disposable income on a child￿ s ability, which we
obtain by analyzing panel data from the NLSY in the United States. We then simulate op-
timal policy in this calibrated model and compare it to an estimated version of the existing
35U.S. tax code. The optimal policy is substantially more redistributive and shifts the ability
distribution up over time. This shift in the ability distribution generates a welfare gain
equivalent to more than one percent of total disposable income in perpetuity, with larger
gains for the poor. Even higher-skilled members of the current generation gain substan-
tially, however, as the gains in e¢ ciency and equality in future generations raise the current
generation￿ s present-value welfare.
This paper also makes a methodological contribution that may be useful for the study
of topics in which endogenous ability plays an important role, such as optimal life-cycle
taxation, social insurance, and early childhood education. Rather than allowing the set of
abilities to be endogenous, we ￿x a set of abilities and allow the distribution across them
to be endogenous. This choice substantially reduces the scale of the optimization problem,
particularly if history-independence of policy is imposed, as is natural in many contexts.
Of course, future research may be able to improve our understanding of the optimal
tax policy studied in this paper. For example, when a panel dataset of su¢ cient duration
allows us to link data on parents￿and children￿ s wages, this will allow estimates of the
intergenerational e⁄ect of parental income on parent-child wage transitions. Incorporating
other dimensions of parental in￿ uence is another natural next step. Some dimensions, such
as time spent with children, may bear on the optimal tax policy directly. Others, such as
spending on speci￿c inputs to child ability such as education, will have implications for a
broader conception of optimal policy. This paper demonstrates that such analyses may yield
further insights into how current tax policy can use its potential to a⁄ect, not merely respond
to, the dynamics of the ability distribution.
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396 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The planner￿ s problem yields these ￿rst-order conditions for ck
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Simplifying by eliminating ￿ and denoting terms as in the text yields the Lemma.
6.1.1 Optimal condition with two ability types
We assume that the incentive constraints bind "downward," as is the standard case in Mirrleesian
optimal tax models. Formally, we assume that wj > wi and that ￿
ijj
t > 0 but ￿
jji
t = 0 for all
generations t: Then, the result (6), for each ability type in generation t + s, is as follows:
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406.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Rewrite the ￿rst-order condition for disposable income from the proof of Lemma 1 as
 
￿
s￿
k
t+s +
s￿1 X
￿=0
￿
s￿￿ X
i
X
i0
￿
i0ji
t+￿
￿
￿
k
t+sjci
t+￿ ￿ ￿
k
t+sjci0
t+￿
￿
+
X
k0
￿
k0jk
t+s ￿
X
k0
￿
kjk0
t+s
!
= ￿￿
s ￿k
t+s
u0 ￿
ck
t+s
￿
1 ￿ ￿
P
j
@pj(wk
t+s;ck
t+s)
@ck
t+s R
j
t+s+1
1 + ￿
P
j
@pj(wk
t+s;ck
t+s)
@ck
t+s
U
j
t+s+1
u0(ck
t+s)
:
Then, sum each side over k:
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The left-hand side simpli￿es dramatically, so that we obtain:
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This holds for all s, yielding the Proposition.
416.3 Appendix Table 1
Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) Variable (2) Mean (3) Standard deviation
Household Income 30,598 22,859.84
Hours worked of respondent 1,692.68 785.42
Hourly wage 9.57 18.24
Child age 11.31 2.02
Child male (dummy) 0.497 0.500
2x2 Parent category 1-child category 1 (dummy) 0.269 0.443
2x2 Parent category 1-child category 2 (dummy) 0.231 0.421
2x2 Parent category 2-child category 1 (dummy) 0.231 0.421
2x2 Parent category 2-child category 2 (dummy) 0.269 0.443
3x3 Parent category 1-child category 1 (dummy) 0.125 0.331
3x3 Parent category 2-child category 1 (dummy) 0.119 0.323
3x3 Parent category 3-child category 1 (dummy) 0.089 0.285
3x3 Parent category 1-child category 2 (dummy) 0.106 0.308
3x3 Parent category 2-child category 2 (dummy) 0.115 0.319
3x3 Parent category 3-child category 2 (dummy) 0.112 0.316
3x3 Parent category 1-child category 3 (dummy) 0.102 0.303
3x3 Parent category 2-child category 3 (dummy) 0.100 0.300
3x3 Parent category 3-child category 3 (dummy) 0.132 0.338
Notes: The table shows the means and standard deviations of the key variables used. The data
are taken from the NLSY, with sample restrictions corresponding to the baseline speci￿cation in
Column 1 of Table 3 of Dahl and Lochner (forthcoming). The variable in question is shown in each
row in Column 1, the mean is shown in Column 2, and the standard deviation in Column 3. The
hourly wage is calculated as a respondent￿ s earnings divided by a respondent￿ s yearly hours worked.
The next four rows show the means of the binary dependent variables used in the regressions in
Table 1. These binary dependent variables take the value of 1 when the child is in the ability
category indicated and the parent is in the ability category indicted, and 0 otherwise (as described
in the text). The ￿nal nine rows show the means of the binary dependent variables used in the
regressions in Appendix Table 7 below. The number of observations is 6,902, corresponding to
2,108 mothers and 3,714 children. Income is measured in year 2000 dollars.
426.4 Appendix Table 2
Appendix Table 2 shows the e⁄ect of parent after-tax income on child￿ s probability of being high-
ability. Two-stage least squares results
Appendix Table 2: E⁄ect of parent after-tax income
(1) Child in high ability category
Income .665 (.261)***
R-squared .204
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a child￿ s measured ability is
above the median. Child ability is measured by their test scores on math and reading components
of the PIAT, as described in the text and in Dahl and Lochner (forthcoming). Child test scores
are measured at the end of each sample period. This binary variable is regressed on the change
in the parent￿ s net-of-tax income (instrumented using the change in the parent￿ s net-of-tax income
predicted using lagged income), a ￿fth-order polynomial in lagged income, an indicator for positive
lagged income, a dummy that equals one if the child￿ s lagged test score is above the median
(and zero otherwise), gender, age, and number of siblings. The number of observations is 6,902,
corresponding to 2,108 mothers and 3,714 children. The table shows the coe¢ cient on income,
with the standard error below in parentheses. Parent income is measured in 1,000￿ s of year 2000
dollars. To approximate the log functional form, we take the inverse hyperbolic sine of income in
each period before we ￿rst-di⁄erence it, so that we approximately estimate the e⁄ect of log income
on child ability, as described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the mother.
The regression controls for child gender, age, and number of siblings. *** denotes signi￿cance at
the 1% level.
436.5 Robustness of results to variation in ￿, T; ￿, and I
Here, we describe the robustness of our results to modifying four assumptions: the value of the
parameter ￿, the number of generations, the value of the parameter ￿, and the number of types of
parent and child ability levels:
6.5.1 Value of ￿
First, ￿ indicates the role of parental ability, relative to a mean ability level, in determining a child￿ s
ability. As shown in expression (14), higher values for ￿ indicate slower mean-reversion of ability
across generations. In the baseline estimates above, we set ￿ = 0:50 based on a large body of
empirical research. That same research, however, acknowledges a potentially wide range of values
for what ￿ represents in our model: namely, the extent to which parents￿abilities are passed to
their children through both genetic and environmental channels not in￿ uenced by parents￿￿nancial
resources. Here we show how our results vary with the value of ￿.
We consider six other values of ￿, namely 0:25, 0:33; 0:40, 0:60, 0:67, 0:75. Appendix Table 3
shows the parameter values chosen by these simulation, as well as the baseline case of ￿ = 0:50 in
bold type for reference.
Appendix Table 3: Parameters with alternative ￿ values
￿ ￿i ￿1
c ￿2
c ￿
￿ = 0:25 -0.15 0.68 0.68 0.57 0.79
￿ = 0:33 -0.18 0.63 0.88 0.66 1.13
￿ = 0:40 0.07 0.62 0.64 0.51 0.88
￿ = 0:50 0.07 0.63 0.63 0.46 0.71
￿ = 0:60 0.19 0.56 0.65 0.52 1.16
￿ = 0:67 -0.17 0.70 0.75 0.51 0.82
￿ = 0:75 -0.13 0.64 0.78 0.59 1.44
Appendix Table 4 shows the transition matrices across generations for these alternative values of
￿.
44Appendix Table 4. Transition matrices under optimal policy with alternative ￿ values
￿ = 0:25 Child ￿ = 0:33 Child ￿ = 0:40 Child
Parent 1 2 Parent 1 2 Parent 1 2
1 0.497 0.504 1 0.511 0.489 1 0.505 0.495
2 0.431 0.570 2 0.442 0.558 2 0.438 0.562
￿ = 0:50 Child
Parent 1 2
1 0.496 0.504
2 0.434 0.566
￿ = 0:60 Child ￿ = 0:67 Child ￿ = 0:75 Child
Parent 1 2 Parent 1 2 Parent 1 2
1 0.513 0.487 1 0.495 0.505 1 0.514 0.486
2 0.445 0.555 2 0.436 0.565 2 0.447 0.553
Appendix Table 5 shows the overall welfare gains from the improved ability distributions generated
by the optimal policies, for each value of ￿.
Appendix Table 5. Welfare with alternative ￿ values
Welfare (in utils) Welfare Gain
Status quo policy Adjusted status quo (Percent of disposable income)
￿ = 0:25 6.871 6.904 1.34%
￿ = 0:33 6.864 6.887 0.89%
￿ = 0:40 6.867 6.893 1.01%
￿ = 0:50 6.869 6.901 1.28%
￿ = 0:60 6.863 6.883 0.79%
￿ = 0:67 6.869 6.900 1.26%
￿ = 0:75 6.862 6.880 0.73%
These tables yield two lessons. First, the variation in results, and particularly in the estimated
welfare gains, are relatively small in magnitude, so that the main lessons from the baseline analysis
are robust to variations in ￿. Second, the welfare gain estimates vary non-monotonically with
￿. To build intuition for this result, start by noting that the cases with larger estimated welfare
gains have lower chosen values for ￿, the standard deviation of the shock to ability. In fact, the
correlation between these series is ￿0:925. When abilities are subject to greater randomness, the
power of optimal policy to reliably target transfers to children of low ability and the ability of it
to provide incentives to parents through di⁄erential treatment of high- and low-ability children are
both diminished. This pattern begs the question of why ￿ varies non-monotonically with ￿. Recall
that the calibration exercise matches an empirical transition matrix. In the extreme case where
￿ = 0, the model￿ s only option for matching the data is to have the e⁄ects of parental resources
on child ability be relatively uniform (i.e., the relative size of ￿1
c compared to ￿2
c is small), so that
45the children of high-income parents have an advantage, as in the data. As ￿ increases, the natural
heritability of ability will overshoot the empirical transition matrix. Then, the calibration will have
two options for reducing heritability to match the data: either a larger shock value ￿ or e⁄ects of
parental resources that are particularly concentrated at low incomes. While the former option will
imply only limited potential for policy gains, in the latter case transfers to low-income parents are
especially potent and the gains from optimal policy are larger. The model￿ s vacillation between
these two options for matching the empirical transition matrices is apparent in the tables above.
6.5.2 Value of T
We also describe the robustness of our results to variation in T, the number of generations simulated.
To do so, we take the baseline simulation￿ s chosen parameter values and simulate di⁄erent horizons.
We ￿nd that the number of generations has little e⁄ect on the results, aside from the fact that a
longer horizon typically allows for greater gains because the years after the ability distribution
shifts become relatively more numerous. To show this, we display the results of the welfare gain
calculation (as in Appendix Table 6, for example), for a variety of horizons.
Appendix Table 6. Welfare with alternative horizons
Welfare Gain
(Percent of disposable income)
T = 6 1.21%
T = 8 1.25%
T = 10 1.28%
T = 12 1.30%
T = 14 1.31%
6.5.3 Value of ￿
Next, we vary the value of ￿ (and thus R, which is equal to 1=￿). The appropriate value of ￿ is far
from clear, both normatively and positively. The benchmark analysis of Ramsey (1928) showed that
the discount rate applied by society ought to equal the sum of the rate of pure time preference and
the product of the consumption elasticity of marginal utility and the growth rate of income. In this
model, there is no steady state growth (when the ability distribution is stable), so we are left with
the rate of pure time preference. While that rate may be positive for households, a case can be made
that society should not discount future utilities. Ramsey (1928) himself wrote: "it is assumed that
we do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically
indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination." This perspective is re￿ ected
in our baseline assumption of ￿ = 1, which in the context of intergenerational optimization seems
particularly appropriate.
Nevertheless, we consider a case in which ￿ = 0:95, so that each generation￿ s utility is worth
￿ve percent less than the previous generation￿ s. This scale of discounting is far less than a standard
annual discounting model would imply, in which a pure time preference rate of two percent would
imply a 25-year generational discount factor of 0:60, but we view that as an implausible degree
of discounting for this scenario. Estimating the model with ￿ = 0:95 and the other baseline
values, the estimated welfare gain goes from 1.28 percent of total income to 1.01 percent of total
46income. The parameter values chosen are extremely similar to those in the baseline simulation. The
diminution in welfare gain appears to be parallel to the ￿nding that the welfare gains increase with
the time horizon of the simulation. For example, the same sized welfare gain occurs when we use
the baseline parameter values with only four generations (namely, 1.01 percent of total income).
6.5.4 Value of I
Finally, we allow for I = 3 parent wage and child ability categories, rather than the two categories
in the baseline results. In these regressions, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals
one when a given parent-child combination occurs, and we control for initial child test score tercile
in the regressions. Appendix Table 7 shows that the probability that children are in the lowest
tercile of ability tends to be lowered by higher parental disposable income, whereas the probability
that children are in the highest tercile of ability tends to be raised by higher parental disposable
income. The point estimates are usually moderate-sized and reasonable; for example, they show
that a 1% increase in parental income causes a 0.216 percentage point decrease in the probability
that a parent in the highest ability category has a child in the lowest ability category. Nonetheless,
these estimates are not apt to detect an e⁄ect of parental disposable income on the outcomes, in
the sense that the dependent variable only takes on a value of 1 rarely (on average 11.1% of the
time). It therefore should be unsurprising that the results are not more signi￿cant. However, the
results in Dahl and Lochner and our results from a design with fewer categories (in Table 1 and
Appendix Table 2) show that these results rely on useful variation in the data. Moreover, the point
estimates in Appendix Table 7 show the expected sign in all six cases where the child￿ s type di⁄ers
from the parent￿ s (i.e., the o⁄-diagonal elements).
Appendix Table 7: Empirical marginal e⁄ects of parental resources on child ability distribution33
(1) Child category 1 (2) Child category 2 (3) Child category 3
(A) Parent category 1 -.025 .302 .159
(.174) (.188) (.150)
(B) Parent category 2 -.032 -.208 .193
(.192) (.180) (.164)
(C) Parent category 3 -.216 -.145 -.028
(.196) (.167) (.147)
33Table notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the parent is in a
given hourly wage category and the child is also in a given ability category (which is potentially
di⁄erent from the parent￿ s ability category). The child￿ s ability is measured by their test scores
on math and reading components of the PIAT, as described in the text and in Dahl and Lochner
(forthcoming). The categories are terciles of the distribution (of wages or ability for parents and
children, respectively), with category 1 constituting the lowest third of the values, category 2
constituting the middle third of the values, and category 3 constituting the highest third of the
values. Parent wage is measured at the beginning of the sample period, and child test score is
measured at the end of each sample period. This binary variable is regressed on the change in
the parent￿ s net-of-tax income (instrumented using the change in the parent￿ s net-of-tax income
predicted using lagged income), a ￿fth-order polynomial in lagged income, an indicator for positive
47Appendix Table 8 shows the empirical transition matrices for the three-type case, as in Table
1 for the baseline case.
Appendix Table 8: Empirical ability transition matrix
(1) Child category 1 (2) Child category 2 (3) Child category 3
(A) Parent category 1 0.377 0.331 0.291
(B) Parent category 2 0.350 0.332 0.318
(C) Parent category 3 0.272 0.337 0.391
Appendix Table 9 shows how the output of the model simulations under the status quo tax
policy compares to the empirical estimates of the statistics shown in Appendix Tables 7 and 8.
Appendix Table 9. Transition matrices and marginal e⁄ects
Data Status quo policy
Child Child
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 0.377 0.331 0.291 1 0.376 0.333 0.291
Transition Parent 2 0.350 0.332 0.318 2 0.348 0.335 0.317
matrix 3 0.272 0.337 0.391 3 0.276 0.331 0.393
1 2 3 1 2 3
Marginal e⁄ect 1 -0.0003 0.0030 0.0016 1 -0.0030 0.0003 0.0027
of parent￿ s c Parent 2 -0.0003 -0.0021 0.0019 2 -0.0022 0.0001 0.0021
on child ability 3 -0.0022 0.0015 -0.0003 3 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0003
The simulation does well matching the empirical targets. The model￿ s transition matrix is
especially well-matched to the data. The marginal e⁄ects are imprecisely estimated in the data
(see Appendix Table 7), but the calibration is able to match the sign of the e⁄ect in seven of the
nine cases and, in particular, in ￿ve of the six o⁄-diagonal elements.
Appendix Table 10 shows the parameter values chosen by the simulation to yield the results of
Appendix Table 9.
Appendix Table 10: Parameters estimated by simulation
Parameter ￿ ￿i ￿1
c ￿2
c ￿3
c ￿
Value under status quo policy -0.18 0.63 0.88 0.66 0.42 1.13
lagged income, gender, age, number of siblings, and dummies for child￿ s lagged test score category.
Nine separate regressions are run corresponding to each of nine possible combinations of three
child categories and three parent categories used to form the dependent variable. The number
of observations in each regression is 6,902, corresponding to 2,108 mothers and 3,714 children.
The table shows the coe¢ cient, with the standard error below in parentheses, for each of the
nine regressions. Parent income is measured in 1,000￿ s of year 2000 dollars. To approximate the
log functional form, we take the inverse hyperbolic sine of income in each period before we ￿rst-
di⁄erence it, so that we approximately estimate the e⁄ect of log income on the dependent variable,
as described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the mother.
48Next we simulate optimal policy. Appendix Table 11 shows the results for the ￿rst generation.
Appendix Table 11. Marginal and average tax rates
Marginal tax rate Average tax rate
Type Optimal Status Quo Optimal Status Quo
Low 11% 2% -412% -62%
Middle 39% 40% -132% -18%
High -19% 37% 33% 17%
Appendix Table 12 reports the di⁄erence between the planner￿ s "budget balance" as a share of
aggregate income in each generation under the optimal and status quo policies.
Appendix Table 12. Intertemporal allocations
Economy￿ s budget balance
(as percent of output)
Generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Optimal - Status Quo -1.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.4 2.4
These di⁄erences in tax policy a⁄ect the evolution of the ability distribution. Appendix Table 13
repeats the transition matrix from Appendix Table 9 for the status quo model between the ￿rst
and second generations. It also shows the comparable transition matrix for the optimal policy.
Appendix Table 13. Transition matrices
Optimal policy Status quo policy
Child Child
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 0.237 0.323 0.440 1 0.376 0.333 0.291
Parent 2 0.288 0.333 0.380 2 0.348 0.335 0.317
3 0.279 0.332 0.390 3 0.276 0.331 0.393
The evolution of the ability distribution is similar to the results under the two-type model, with
approximately the same share of the population having the middle skill level under the optimal
and status quo policies, and the optimal policy yielding a six percent greater share with the highest
skill and a six percent smaller share with the lowest skill level.
Welfare is much higher under the optimal policy, and it is more equitably distribute. This is
shown in Appendix Table 14, which performs the same thought experiment as in the main text,
isolating the gain from only the improved ability distribution due to the optimal policy.
Appendix Table 14. Welfare
Welfare (in utils) Welfare Gain
Type Status quo policy Adjusted status quo (Percent of disposable income)
Low 8.126 8.211 6.64%
Middle 8.200 8.282 5.88%
High 8.303 8.380 5.35%
Overall 8.202 8.283 5.98%
49These results indicate that the power of optimal policy to adjust the ability distribution is sub-
stantially greater￿ equal to six percent of total output￿ when the range of wage types considered is
expanded.
50